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Abstract
This Commentary forms a response to Nikogosian’s and Kickbusch’s forward-looking perspective about the 
legal strength of international health instruments. Building on their arguments, in this commentary we consider 
what we can learn from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) for the adoption of new legal 
international health instruments.
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Introduction 
With the adoption of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Constitution in 1946, the World Health Assembly (WHA) was 
granted considerable standard setting powers, including the 
authority to adopt binding treaties and regulations.1 During 
the first 50 years of its existence, the WHA barely made use 
of this possibility: the only legally binding instrument it 
adopted were the International Health Regulations,2 offering 
a protection mechanism against the spread of infectious 
diseases. Yet, as Nikogosian and Kickbusch3 point out in 
their perspective to this journal, the start of the 21st century 
opened a new phase where legal instruments were more 
readily adopted. During these years a revised set of the 
International Health Regulations was adopted as well as the 
first WHO treaties: the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC, 2003) and its first Protocol (2013).4-6 
The present authors take inspiration from the FCTC in 
asking whether further instruments in the area of (chronic) 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs) may be possible, for we 
consider curbing NCDs the highest priority in global health. 
It is widely recognised that the majority of deaths presently 
occurring globally are the result of NCDs – in particular 
cardiovascular diseases, most cancers, chronic respiratory 
diseases and diabetes. In relation to this, it is also broadly 
acknowledged that NCDs are fuelled by the persistent increase 
in NCD-related risk factors, ie, smoking, excess alcohol use, 
unhealthy eating and physical inactivity.7 However, the only 
risk factor that is currently regulated through a treaty is 
tobacco, through the FCTC (Figure 1).
As Nikogosian and Kickbusch explain, the FCTC and its 
Protocol “unlocked” the treaty-making power of WHO 
contained in its Constitution, and they mention various 
successes of the FCTC as the first legally binding WHO 
instrument, dedicated to NCDs. They also recognize that 
“further research in the coming years would bring more 
details and depths to the topic.”
This commentary responds to the authors’ viewpoints by 
reflecting on the opportunities for adopting new international 
health standards on NCDs within the context of the WHO. 
In our view, the successful legal standard setting through the 
FCTC raises at least two important further questions: (1) 
what does it take to adopt new (binding) standard-setting 
instruments for NCDs; and (2) what should be the nature, 
scope and substance of these instruments? 
What Does it Take for New International Health Instruments 
to be Adopted?
As submitted by Nikogosian and Kickbusch, “the very fact 
that globally binding instruments in health were feasible” 
kick-started debates and expectations for further possible 
instruments. Examples of such instruments suggested so 
far, include a Framework Convention on Pharmaceutical 
Innovation and a broader Framework Convention of 
Global Health.8,9 Another example under serious, but slow, 
consideration within the WHO, is a Convention on Research 
and Development.10
At the end of their article, the authors express “little doubt 
that the international health instrumentarium will further 
expand and develop, with binding and soft-law instruments 
alike.” We do not disagree with this statement, but want to 
put into the mix that, in order to arrive at legal standards, 
or in accelerating standard-setting processes, it will be 
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highly instrumental to better understand what drives or 
accommodates the development of new international (treaty) 
norms. 
One way of understanding the dynamics and conditions 
of new norm creation is offered by so-called norm life-
cycle models, developed in social constructivist strands of 
international relations theory.11 According to such models, the 
creation of new (treaty) norms tends to follow fairly straight-
forward paths or ‘life-cycles,’ and may require certain actors 
and conditions to come together throughout subsequent 
stages of norm creation (the original ‘norm-life cycle’ model 
is by Finnemore and Sikkink) (Figure 2).11
Refinements of the original model formulate in more detail 
the various stages of norm development, inter alia proposing 
that new (treaty) norms follow a ‘seven-step sequence,’ starting 
with (i) the formulation of an initial idea by an (influential) 
(group of) norm-entrepreneur(s) with a strong organizational 
platform to spread their message.12 Although different 
people and groups can be norm entrepreneurs, including, 
importantly, NGOs, in the context of the FCTC, a common 
understanding is that Gro-Harlem Brundtland, the former 
Director-General of the WHO, was an instrumental norm 
entrepreneur in persuading the WHO to move forward on the 
FCTC.13 In contrast, Margaret Chan seems to have suggested 
in 2012 on the R&D Convention that non-binding options 
could also be explored, which at least some commentators 
count as an important reason for failure to move forward at 
that time.10
Typically, formulation of initial ideas is followed by (ii) 
‘network configuration’ and (iii) ‘issue formulation,’ as 
essential components of the norm emergence process. Issue 
formulation entails defining the ‘technical and normative 
scope’ of the problem, and the wording of the newly proposed 
norm. ‘Network configuration’ implies building a network 
of supporters that can lend support, and gives the norm 
legitimacy and credibility.12 This can entail wider civil society 
support, or institutional support by key actors. On these 
factors, a recent study contends that global alcohol control 
advocacy networks have been less successful in advancing 
new norms in comparison to tobacco control networks, 
because alcohol advocacy yet has ‘to overcome divisions based 
on competing problem definitions and solutions to alcohol 
harm.’14 Moreover tobacco control networks appear to have 
effectively evolved ‘from a group of dedicated individuals to 
a global coalition of membership-based organizations’ and 
‘more effective in creating and maintaining wide-spread 
consensus about effective policies to harm reduction.’14 
Norm-cycle theory highlights that achieving ‘scientific 
closure,’ along with ‘normative closure,’ on the norm, are 
essential components to norm emergence.12 Naturally, this 
can be challenging for certain global health challenges, for 
industries may actively seek to prevent or delay scientific 
closure on the harmful nature of the use of their products. 
Finally, concluding stages of norm adoption would include 
(iv) dialogues between proactive and conservative states, 
and (v) a moment of ‘political’ closure.15 Political closure 
presupposes a ‘critical mass of relevant [opposing and 
supporting] State actors’ adopting the new norm, and is 
typically referred to as the ‘tipping point’ of a norm. This is the 
moment after which stages of (vi) (soft or hard) ‘legalization’ 
and (vii) institutionalization and operationalization come in 
sight. 
While it is impossible, in this short article, to assess how 
various current proposals for new instruments hold up against 
this model, looking ahead at possible lessons that could be 
gleaned from the FCTC through such models, are, first: who 
are the current norm entrepreneurs driving new (binding) 
norms on NCD issue areas, and what are their organizational 
platforms? To what extent are nascent international NCD 
coalitions separately or jointly formulating a clear message on 
salient issues? Additional issues include: how has the FCTC 
process been influenced by particular norm entrepreneurs, 
solid network configuration, issue formulation, and a measure 
of ‘scientific closure’ on the harmful nature of tobacco use?14 
While we do not purport to have all the answers in this 
Response, these important questions deserve to be raised.
Nature, Scope and Substance of New International Health 
Instruments
Alongside an identification of the dynamics, processes and 
conditions necessary for moving towards the adoption of 
new standards, we should identify what these instruments 
Figure 1. Modifiable Behavioural Risk Factors (Regional Office for 
the Eastern Mediterranean, WHO).  Reprinted with permission from 
the WHO. 
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Figure 2. Original Norm Life-Cycle Model by Sikkink and Finnemore.11
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should regulate as a priority issue, and what should be their 
nature, scope and content. As mentioned, currently tobacco 
is the only risk factor regulated through a treaty. The other 
mentioned risk factors are currently addressed through the 
non-binding Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and 
Health and the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use 
of Alcohol.16,17 A recent innovation is the new target-setting 
‘WHO Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control 
of NCDs 2013-2020.’ This instrument formulates nine global 
targets on the four NCD risk factors.
It is of crucial importance to study the impact and effectiveness 
of existing strategies, and to consider whether a legally 
binding instrument would be more effective. Nikogosian 
and Kickbusch list a number of benefits of binding health 
instruments, as opposed to non-binding ones. Yet, the 
current reality in international law is, that against the trend 
set out by Nikogosian and Kickbusch in their article, treaties 
are increasingly being superseded by ‘informal lawmaking,’ 
involving new forms, processes and actors for norm 
creation.18 These can include Guidelines, Codes, Standards 
or even Action Plans, including the ones already mentioned 
above.18
Indeed, while treaties are authoritative and influential, and 
can play an important role in domestic legal systems, it is 
important to consider a broad range of regulatory options, 
including both formal and informal ones, when it comes to 
designing new NCD instruments. In fact, contrary to some 
popular views, States may opt for non-binding instruments 
not necessarily to escape being legally bound, but because the 
community as a whole favours swift action and responses, 
or greater multi-stakeholder involvement, which highly 
formalized, binding, technical treaty negotiations, and 
possibly lengthy ratification procedures, do not always allow 
for.18 Again, this reason has been cited in the context of States 
not being eager to move towards a binding treaty on R&D 
in 2012.10 In this respect, further research on when binding 
treaty adoption may be pursued in favour of, or alongside, 
non-binding instruments is welcome too. 
Finally, we may need to consider the manner in which 
international norm adoption can be successfully informed 
or driven by domestic laws and successes. For example, there 
is clear evidence from Mexico that taxes on sugar-sweetened 
beverages result in proportional reductions in consumption, 
especially if aimed at raising the retail price by 20% or more.19 
This evidence could inspire provisions on taxes in a possible 
treaty regulating unhealthy diets. While domestic good practice 
examples cannot simply be transplanted to the international 
level, they can provide useful examples and elements for new 
international health instruments. In particular, the further 
experimentation with and implementation of the ‘menu of 
policy options’ currently listed in the new WHO NCD 2013-
2030 Action Plan can yield further building blocks. 
All in all, we clearly see a window of opportunity to consider 
and pursue the adoption of new standard-setting instruments 
in the field of health. What is needed to start with, is a group 
of vocal norm entrepreneurs in practice and academics, 
with a strong and concerted message, along with optimism, 
creativity and commitment from within the WHO to follow 
through on its law-making mandate, and for norm leaders to 
stand up in this context. The sheer size of the NCD pandemic 
demands a forward-looking perspective and the most 
progressive approach possible.
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